SA-08(24) Secure Failure and Recovery

Baselines

Guidance

The principle of secure failure and recovery states that neither a failure in a system function or mechanism nor any recovery action in response to failure leads to a violation of security policy. The principle of secure failure and recovery parallels the principle of continuous protection to ensure that a system is capable of detecting (within limits) actual and impending failure at any stage of its operation (i.e., initialization, normal operation, shutdown, and maintenance) and to take appropriate steps to ensure that security policies are not violated. In addition, when specified, the system is capable of recovering from impending or actual failure to resume normal, degraded, or alternative secure operations while ensuring that a secure state is maintained such that security policies are not violated.

Failure is a condition in which the behavior of a component deviates from its specified or expected behavior for an explicitly documented input. Once a failed security function is detected, the system may reconfigure itself to circumvent the failed component while maintaining security and provide all or part of the functionality of the original system, or it may completely shut itself down to prevent any further violation of security policies. For this to occur, the reconfiguration functions of the system are designed to ensure continuous enforcement of security policy during the various phases of reconfiguration.

Another technique that can be used to recover from failures is to perform a rollback to a secure state (which may be the initial state) and then either shutdown or replace the service or component that failed such that secure operations may resume. Failure of a component may or may not be detectable to the components using it. The principle of secure failure indicates that components fail in a state that denies rather than grants access. For example, a nominally "atomic" operation interrupted before completion does not violate security policy and is designed to handle interruption events by employing higher-level atomicity and rollback mechanisms (e.g., transactions). If a service is being used, its atomicity properties are well-documented and characterized so that the component availing itself of that service can detect and handle interruption events appropriately. For example, a system is designed to gracefully respond to disconnection and support resynchronization and data consistency after disconnection.

Failure protection strategies that employ replication of policy enforcement mechanisms, sometimes called defense in depth, can allow the system to continue in a secure state even when one mechanism has failed to protect the system. If the mechanisms are similar, however, the additional protection may be illusory, as the adversary can simply attack in series. Similarly, in a networked system, breaking the security on one system or service may enable an attacker to do the same on other similar replicated systems and services. By employing multiple protection mechanisms whose features are significantly different, the possibility of attack replication or repetition can be reduced. Analyses are conducted to weigh the costs and benefits of such redundancy techniques against increased resource usage and adverse effects on the overall system performance. Additional analyses are conducted as the complexity of these mechanisms increases, as could be the case for dynamic behaviors. Increased complexity generally reduces trustworthiness. When a resource cannot be continuously protected, it is critical to detect and repair any security breaches before the resource is once again used in a secure context.

Related controls 6

• CP-10 System Recovery and Reconstitution L M H P
• CP-12 Safe Mode L M H P
• SC-07 Boundary Protection L M H P
• SC-08 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity L M H P
• SC-24 Fail in Known State L M H P
• SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention L M H P